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How Doctors Became Distributors:
A Fabled Story of Vertical Relations
Peter J. Hammer*

I. Introduction
Professionalism does not exist in a vacuum. Professions exist
within a complicated web of social and economic relations, with
social structures serving often underappreciated economic roles.'
Guilds, for example, with, among other things, their strict
membership control, apprenticeship requirements, and noncompetition arrangements, provide a method to package and
distribute information and technical expertise as a commodity itself.
Physicians (and other professionals) can also be viewed as bundles of
information and, radical as it may seem, hospitals can be thought of
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Professor Hammer
received his J.D. and Doctorate in Economics from the University of Michigan. A
recipient of a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health Policy Investigator Award,
Professor Hammer's scholarship interest involves antitrust law and the health care
industry. He is also the founder and director of the Program for Cambodian Law
and Development at the University of Michigan.
1 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963). Arrow contends that "institutional
organization and the observable mores of the medical profession" should be
included as "data to be used in assessing the competitiveness of the medical-care
market." Id. at 944. Unfortunately, the call to engage in a richer
economic/institutional analysis of professional relations has gone largely unheeded.
2

As Arrow Observed:

But the demand for information is difficult to discuss in the rational
terms usually employed. The value of information is frequently not
known in any meaningful sense to the buyer; if, indeed, he knew
enough to measure the value of the information, he would know the
information itself. But information, in the form of skilled care, is
precisely what is being bought from most physicians, and, indeed, from
most professionals.
Id. at 946.
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primarily as economic firms arranging for the provision of medical
services. At the same time, most observers would concede that
physicians are more than simply vessels for the commodification of
information, and hospitals are more than just methods for organizing
the means of medical production. Further complicating matters is the
fact that health care is influenced by an elaborate array of
government regulations, public subsidies, market failures, and
various traditions of self-regulation. These forces form the backdrop
against which medical antitrust disputes are litigated and decided.
This essay seeks to inform understandings of antitrust and the
professions at the millennium by juxtaposing judicial treatment of
hospital-physician exclusive contracting cases with judicial treatment3
of dealer termination cases as a form of vertical non-price restraints.
In the typical exclusive contract, a hospital will enter into a
relationship with a group of physicians, such as radiologists or
anesthesiologists, to be the sole provider of a package of services to
the hospital. This contrasts with the traditional "open" medical staff
model characteristic of most other hospital-physician relations, where
basically any qualified physician is extended the "privilege" of
practicing at the hospital. In the typical manufacturer-distributor
relationship, on the other hand, a manufacturer of a product enters
into a contract with a retailer for the distribution of the commodity.
The contract often imposes a variety of 4obligations and restrictions
controlling the behavior of the distributor.
Many themes emerge from the antitrust comparison of doctors
and distributors. As a descriptive matter, doctors are functioning
more and more as passive distributors of health care. Viewing doctors

3 As

others writing in medical antitrust can appreciate, it is not uncommon to

get what you think is a fresh insight into a question, only to find that Clark
Havighurst has already written about the topic, sometimes decades earlier. This is
no exception. See Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust
Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1071, 1144-57 (1984)

(exploring the analogy between antitrust treatment of vertical contracting and
physician-hospital contracting). Havighurst explores the analogy between hospital

exclusive contracting and vertical non-price restraints, but also stresses the
limitations of such a comparison. Id. at 1146 n.243.
4 From a theory of the firn perspective, contracting is an alternative to single
firm ownership and control through vertical integration. A manufacturer could
simply build and own its system of distribution, as many do. A persistent puzzle in
antitrust law is how to deal with conduct that when done "in house" raises no
serious antitrust issues in the absence of monopoly power policed by section two,
but when made the object of contract is subject to stricter antitrust scrutiny and
potential liability under section one of the Sherman Act.
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as distributors highlights the loss of special status and autonomy
physicians enjoy as they become increasingly viewed as inputs into
the process of health care production. Changes in the law often track
changing facts on the ground. This particular antitrust transformation
tracks the trajectory outlined by Henry Maine: a movement away
from status-based professional distinctions to antitrust distinctions
based upon contractual relations. 5 The contracts focus of
contemporary medical antitrust law is suggestive of the power of the
economic forces reshaping the organizational structure of how
medical services are provided and financed. But in these still
evolving markets, it is important to strike a cautionary note. While
antitrust analysis has moved from status to contract, the realm of
contracts is itself highly contestable. As the health services research
literature indicates, the physician's ultimate role in the "firms"
providing medical services is yet to be determined. Whether (and to
what degree) doctors end up as distributors, employees, co-owners, or
risk-bearing purveyors of health insurance remains to be seen.
This essay cuts through many different layers of antitrust law
as to which, depending upon the specific legal question, I have fairly
conflicted views. The following can serve as a compass for the
reader. First, although I remain critical of the Supreme Court's
underdeveloped analytical treatment of the efficiency attributes of
vertical relations, I find the judicial framing of health care relations as
"vertical" to be helpful to the extent that it focuses attention on the
nature of the contractual relations themselves, rather than the
professional or quasi-professional status of the parties. From this
perspective, the move from status to contract is a step in the right
direction. Second, while the economics of hospital-physician
relations can be complicated, 6 the analysis of most forms of hospital

5 "[W]e may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto
been a movement from Status to Contract." Henry Maine, ANCIENT LAW 182 (Sir
Frederick Pollock ed., 1930). In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975), the Supreme Court finally confronted and rejected the status-based claim
that the learned professions were not engaged in "trade" as regulated under the
Sherman Act. The progressive realignment of antitrust treatment of hospital
contracting practices with the antitrust standards governing contracting practices
elsewhere in the economy simply works to complete the Goldfarb revolution.
6 While antitrust doctrine is fond of categorical distinctions between

"horizontal" and "vertical" relations, it is doubtful that health care markets will

ever be able to fit neatly into such a frame. Too many actors are involved, engaging
in too many complicated transactions, encompassing both sophisticated medical
services and the allocation of competing types of risk over time. For example,
individuals, on behalf of themselves and their families, but acting typically through
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exclusive contracting that have been litigated to date is relatively
straight-forward and generally supports the procompetitive role that
courts attribute to these arrangements. As such, most antitrust courts
are reaching the correct outcome in upholding these exclusive
agreements. However, professionalism is not an empty vessel and, as
Arrow reminds us, social institutions can play underappreciated
economic roles. Therefore, it is important that the superficial
reasoning that often follows legal categorization of a relationship as
"vertical" not infect the ability of courts to appreciate the underlying
complexities that health care cases may often present. As antitrust
treatment of the professions moves from status to contract, it
highlights the need for more sophisticated economic analysis of
contracting practices more generally, and of the professions in
particular.
The first section outlines antitrust treatment of vertical
restraints in the context of standard manufacturing relations. The
second section explores the economics underlying hospital-physician
relationships. The third section constructs a composite judicial
approach from the hospital exclusive contracting cases that illustrates
how doctors are indeed being treated as distributors for antitrust
purposes. The final section concludes by examining what future
contracting and antitrust trends in health care might look like, and
what implications this may have for antitrust law and the professions.

the agency of their employers, purchase insurance to cover the costs of medical
services that they hope they will never need. Moreover, the insurance and medical
service components of health care are being combined in an increasing variety of
packages. Managed care represents a complicated system for the joint production of
medical services and insurance, and therefore embodies agents acting as both
buyers and sellers within an array of real and potential conflicts of interest. See
Lawrence Casalino, Managing Uncertainty: Intermediate Organizationsas Triple
Agents, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1055 (2001) (Special Issue, Kenneth Arrow
and the Changing Economics of Health Care) (eds. Peter J. Hammer, Deborah

Haas-Wilson, and William M. Sage). It is difficult, if not impossible to completely
untangle this web into distinct sets of relations that are "vertical" and others that are
"horizontal" for antitrust purposes. The fact that many courts try and do just that is
itself an interesting fact. In the end, such efforts must be met with some level of
skepticism. Moreover, one should be open to exploring what lessons the limitations
that these classification exercises face in health care markets may have for antitrust
doctrine in other sectors of the economy.
7 See generally Arrow, supra note 1.
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II. A Fabled Antitrust Story of Vertical Relations
The revolution in judicial treatment of vertical non-price
restraints just pre-dates the transformation of health care markets. In
Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,8 the Supreme Court
overturned its previous per se condemnation of vertical non-price
restraints, declaring that restraints arising from vertical forms of9
contracting would be subject to more lenient rule of reason analysis.
Under rule of reason analysis, judges were instructed to balance
potential losses attributed to reductions in intra-brand competition
against possible gains in terms of enhanced inter-brand competition. 10
Motivating the Court was the belief that manufacturer-imposed
restrictions on intra-brand competition could strengthen the
competitiveness of the brand and thereby increase the vitality of
inter-brand competition. In theory, the existence of sufficient interbrand competition will act as a self-policing mechanism to discipline
manufacturers who impose restraints that do not enhance the value of
their product in the eyes of consumers.1 I In Business Electronics
Corp. v. Sharp Electronics, Corp.,12 however, the Court moved
substantially beyond simply suggesting that the effects of intra- and
inter-brand competition must be balanced against each other, to
asserting what amounts to a near legal presumption in favor of the
efficiency of manufacturer-imposed vertical restraints (in the absence
of market power).13
The modem vertical restraints cases track the ascendancy of
Chicago school law and economics as a force shaping antitrust law.

8

433 U.S. 36 (1977).

9 Id. at 58.
'o Id. at 54-55.

'I Id. at 52 n.19.
12

485 U.S. 717 (1988).

13 Id. at 725-26. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984),
completes the vertical restraints trilogy by imposing substantial evidentiary hurdles
of plaintiffs seeking to prove the existence of an anticompetitive agreement among
suppliers and distributors on the basis of circumstantial evidence. If the evidence
purporting to prove the existence of an agreement is as consistent with
procompetitive business justifications as it is with anticompetitive conduct, then the
plaintiff must introduce additional evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent action on the part of the manufacturer. Id. at 761-63. The burden of
this requirement increases in direct proportion to the scope of procompetitive
benefits that courts presume to associate with vertical contracting practice.
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These cases also represent a shift away from the social, political, and
economic values that animated early judicial hostility towards
manufacturer attempts to interfere with the autonomy and
independence of small retailers and distributors. Part of this shift is
ideological - competing beliefs about the virtues of small versus big
business, fairness versus efficiency, and trust in private versus public
forms of control. 14 Part of the shift in contemporary antitrust law's
treatment of vertical restraints represents underlying changes in the
economics of national and increasingly international markets economies of scale dictate larger sizes of operation, the costs of
information and monitoring determine prevailing patterns of private
contracting, and the geographic heterogeneity of consumer
preferences influences the appropriate degree of local versus
centralized control of price and non-price decision making. 15
It was not long before changes in judicial treatment of vertical
relations among manufacturers and distributors began to influence
antitrust treatment of health care. Still, the analogy between vertical
non-price restraints and hospital-physician contracting was and is not
perfect. I characterize the story of how doctors became distributors as
a fable in vertical relations. There are pronounced differences
between the economics of physician-hospital relations and vertical
systems of manufacturer-distributor relations. Physician-hospital
relations have much stronger overtones of joint production. 6 This
14

Indeed, Justice Holmes 1911 dissenting views in Dr. Miles, which

substantively resonate with the precepts of modem Chicago School teachings,
sounds as much in deeply held social as it does economic beliefs.
Dr. Miles Medical Company knows better than we do what will enable
it to do the best business .... I cannot believe that in the long run the
public will profit by this court permitting knaves to cut reasonable
prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair, if not
to destroy, the production and sale of articles which it is assumed to be
desirable that the public should be able to get.
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
15 But economics alone can only push so far. In the end, economics
and
ideology are infinitely contestable. The fact that efficiency will never completely
trump notions of fairness, even as an antitrust consideration, can be seen in the fact
that dealer termination cases continue to have jury appeal, no matter how
skeptically they are viewed by economists, and the fact that dealer protection
statutes continue to be popular in political markets.
16 See Havighurst, supra note 3, at 1144 n.243. For further discussion of
limitations in the analogy between doctors and distributors, see infra notes 25-26
and accompanying text.
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calls the tightness of the economic analogy between doctors and
distributors into some degree of question. In addition, and perhaps
more importantly, judicial treatment of vertical restraints has a fabled
character all its own. Rather than developing a rigorous analysis of
the efficiency and cost-benefit implications of various vertical
contracting practices, as might have been expected after Sylvania and
as called for by Justice Stevens' dissent in Business Electronics,17 the
efficiency of vertical restraints is largely accepted as received judicial
wisdom. In this manner, categories such as "vertical" and
"horizontal" in antitrust law, and the assertion of the
"procompetitive" benefits of vertical restraints often represent legal
conclusions rather than declarations of economically proven fact. The
rhetoric of vertical relations frequently eclipses any substantive
economic analysis.

Il. The Economics of Hospital-Physician Relations
The organization of hospital-physician relations has always
presented a puzzle for economists. In the early 1970s, there was a
discrete body of 18
literature exploring different possible models of
hospital behavior. Newhouse, for example, postulated that hospitals
acted as joint maximizers of quality and quantity. 19 Lee, on the other
hand, argued that hospital behavior was best modeled in terms of
20
maximizing the individual utility of hospital administrators.
Alternatively, Pauly and Redisch argued that hospitals were best
characterized as physician cartels, organized and operated to
maximize the profits of the medical staff.2 1 It is not surprising that
these modeling exercises had a limited life in the literature.
Competing models of hospital behavior make sense only if hospitals
have substantial discretion as to how they can behave. With
Medicare's introduction of prospective payment in 1983 and the cost
consciousness triggered by double-digit medical inflation ushering in
U.S. at 748-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

17

Business Electric, 485

18

For a survey of these models see Phillip Jacobs, A Survey of Economic

Models of Hospitals, 11 INQUIRY 83 (1974).
19 See Joseph P. Newhouse, Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An
Economic Model of a Hospital, 60 AM. ECON. REv. 64 (1970).
20 See Maw Lin Lee, A Conspicuous Production Theory of Hospital Behavior,
38 S. ECON. J. 48 (1971).
21 See Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a
Physicians' Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 87 (1973).
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the managed care revolution, less and less discretion existed in
hospital markets. In this environment, one would expect non-profit
hospitals to act more like their for-profit counterparts. It is also in this
new environment of cost consciousness that hospitals started
exercising greater control over their medical staffs and began
experimenting with exclusive contracts for various sub-groups of
physicians.
The majority of hospitals, even today, are non-profit
organizations. The typical non-profit hospital consists of a Board of
Trustees, a group of hospital administrators, and the medical staff an independent body of the physicians who have privileges to work at
the hospital. 22 Whether and when a hospital should be treated as a
single, well-defined economic firm raises its own important antitrust
issues under Copperweld.23 The resolution of the Copperweld
question is largely determined by the degree of structural autonomy
afforded the medical staff as an entity, and a practical inquiry into
whether there is a legitimate unity of interest between the Board and
the medical staff. The trend over the past two decades has been
towards organizing and operating hospital structures in a manner that
makes them look and act more like rationally integrated firms. Under
such circumstances, most courts generally hold that hospitals are

The court in Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1262
(N.D. Ind. 1985), provides a nice description of the basic structure of most nonprofit hospitals and their relationship with physicians and the setting in which
exclusive contracts are entered.
22

[P]laintiff, Elena Ezpeleta, is a medical doctor whose specialty is
anesthesiology. Defendant operates Our Lady of Mercy Hospital
(OLM), a small private medical facility located in Dyer, Indiana. Like
many hospitals in Indiana it does not employ salaried physicians to
perform medical services. The medical staff is made up of independent
contractors and their employees. In the case of the anesthesiology
department a professional medical corporation, Suburban Anesthesia
Associates, had an exclusive contract to provide anesthesiology
services to OLM during the initial period in which this action arises.
While an independent contractor may employ physicians, the right of
an individual physician to practice in the hospital is subject to the
granting of "staff privileges." Without staff privileges no physician,
regardless of his employment with a contract provider, can practice in
the hospital. Standards for admission and continued staff membership
[are] determined by the hospital.
Id. at 1265-66.
23 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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legally incapable of conspiring with their medical staffs.24
An appreciation of the complexities of hospital-physician
relations begins to suggest some of the limitations in the analogy
between doctors and distributors. Rather than standing at distinct
levels of production, physicians and hospitals are, in many respects,
joint producers of medical services. One implication of the joint
nature of hospital-physician production is that one would ordinarily
expect these services to be provided in an integrated fashion. 25 A
second insight is that the nature of such integration will be heavily
dependent upon the type of physician service in question and its
economic relationship to the provision of hospital services. There is a
range of services that physicians can provide independent of
hospitals, and the technological trend has been to increase the scope
of services available on an out-patient or free-standing basis. There is
another range of services for which the physician component
(professional expertise) is primary and the hospital component
(primarily physical capital and supportive services) is secondary.
Finally, there is a range of hospital-based practices where the hospital
component is primary and the physician service is secondary.
Hospital-based
practices
consist
primarily
of pathology,
anesthesiology, radiology, and emergency room services. Here, the
patient's choice of physician is largely ancillary to their choice of the

24 To minimize antitrust liability under Copperweld, the hospital
must limit the
independence of the medical staff and subordinate the interests of physicians to the
independent and distinct interests of the hospital. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Mem.
Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 703-04 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding no Sherman Act § 1 claim
can be based upon the revocation of the plaintiffs staff privileges because under
Copperweld a hospital cannot conspire with itself); Canady v. Providence Hosp.,
903 F. Supp. 125, 127 (D. D.C. 1995) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss
finding no concerted action in light of the Copperweld doctrine); Purgess v.
Sharrock, No. 91 Civ. 0621, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17057, at *9 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 9,
1992) (holding as a matter of law that the hospital was incapable of conspiring with
members of its medical staff).
25 It is seldom economically rational for complementary services to be
provided by economically independent entities. See Peter J. Hammer, Medical
Antitrust Reform: Arrow, Coase and the Changing Structure of the Firm, in THE
PRIVATIZATION OF HEALTH CARE REFORM (G. Bloche ed., Oxford Univ. Press)
(forthcoming 2002). The joint nature of hospital-physician production argues in
favor of greater integration and raises a number of questions about the function and
structure of hospital-physician relations in the context of competing theories of the
firm. The fact that one would predict that integration is likely to occur, however,
says little about how such integration is likely to take place in practice. See
discussion of the health services research literature infra notes 75-77 and
accompanying text.
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hospital as a provider. Not surprisingly, this last category represents
the strongest economic case for "vertical" integration on the part of
the hospital and has been the area where hospitals have been most
active in entering into exclusive contracts with discrete sets of
providers. 26 In this domain, the hospital has a strong incentive to
integrate and the economic position of the hospital will likely
dominate that of the physician.

IV. The Antitrust Response: Doctors As Distributors
In the face of transformations within health care markets,
hospitals have tried to obtain tighter control over their medical staffs
and to implement exclusive contracts with hospital-based practices.
These efforts have generated substantial antitrust activity. A recent
While the analogy between hospitals entering into an exclusive contracts
with physicians and manufacturers contracting with distributors is useful in
building bridges between two areas of antitrust law, other structural analogies can
also be invoked. Some courts have classified hospitals as the "buyer" of physician
services. See, e.g., Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Med. Ctr., 684 F.2d
1346 (7th Cir. 1982).
26

Because the patient generally takes no part in the selection of a
particular anesthesiologist (the surgeon makes the choice), and because
the expense of anesthesia services to the patient is ordinarily at least
partially insured or otherwise payable by a third party, it might be
somewhat anomalous to treat the patient as a buyer. The patient in these
circumstances receives the service but does so without making any
significant economic decision. It may thus be more appropriate for
antitrust purposes to treat the hospital as the purchaser, in view of the
hospital's responsibility for assuring the availability of anesthesia
services for its patients, its incentive to maximize the use of its surgical
facilities and its potential liability for negligent rendition of anesthesia
services in its operating rooms. If the hospital rather than the individual
patient is regarded as the purchaser, the relevant market could be
defined as the area in which Associates operates and in which the
Medical Center (rather than the patient) can practicably turn for
alternative provision of anesthesia services.
Id. at 1354. Alternatively, for certain other services courts have suggested that the
physician might more appropriately be viewed as an employee of the hospital.
[T]he vast majority of work performed by pathologists involve
laboratory tests and analyses that require the pathologist to rely a great
deal upon the hospital's physical facilities and equipment. Thus, it is
easy to see the pathologist as similar to an employee of the hospital
rather than an independent contractor hired by the hospital for each
specific task he must perform.
Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 676 F. Supp. 1388, 1403 (C.D. I11.1987),
aff'd, 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1998).
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survey of medical antitrust litigation I conducted with Bill Sage
revealed that roughly one-third of all healthcare antitrust cases
between 1985 and 1999 consisted of staff-privilege disputes, while
27
another one-third consisted of disputes over exclusive contracting.
This finding is rather startling. Conflicts over hospital-physician
relationships dominate medical antitrust litigation.28 While common,
these antitrust suits were not even mildly successful. Our survey
indicated that plaintiffs received favorable outcomes in
cases and only a slightly higher
approximately 9% of staff privilege
29
16% of exclusive contract cases.
When one examines the exclusive contracting cases as a
whole, certain patterns emerge. Most hospital exclusive contract
cases involve hospital-based practices - emergency room,
anesthesiology, pathology, radiology and to a more limited extent
cardiology. Almost every exclusive contracting case tries, usually
unsuccessfully, to fit itself within the frame of an established
category of per se type illegality - group boycotts, tying agreements,
exclusive dealing arrangements. These are confused areas of antitrust
law outside health care, and judicial treatment of hospital exclusive
contract cases has done little to clarify these concepts. More
frequently, judicial efforts to escape the plaintiffs per se frame
simply create more doctrinal confusion. For example, some courts
will invoke the alleged special status of health professions to justify
be argued many
later,
analysis.
As will
instead
of per senor
rule
of reason
very helpful.
Alternatively,
is neither
necessary,
this move

27

See Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality,

and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
28

Only 17% of the cases in the survey involved antitrust disputes over

managed care. Id.
29 In calculating outcomes, we only coded significant dispositions. We
considered a disposition to be "significant" if it determined or substantially
influenced the overall outcome of the dispute between the parties. Minor procedural
rulings in favor of one party were not considered "significant." We counted the
denial of a summary judgment motion made by the defendant as a plaintiff victory,
because it imposes potentially large trial costs on defendants even if they
eventually prevail, and therefore promotes settlement. As such, the standard we
employed is likely to overstate plaintiff victories. We also counted a significant
outcome in district court as a plaintiff (or defendant) victory, even if it was
subsequently reversed on appeal. Id.
30

See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983); Koefoot v.

Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 610 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. 11. 1985); Sherman Coll. of
Straight Chiropracticv. Am. ChiropracticAss'n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 772 (N.D. Ga.
1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987).
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courts invoke the antitrust injury doctrine as a means of short
circuiting the substantive antitrust analysis. Antitrust injury claims
were invoked in 45% of the opinions addressing exclusive
contracting claims.31
While not invoked in all cases and not even the dominant
form of judicial analysis, one can create an interesting composite
approach to hospital exclusive contract cases that maps surprisingly
well onto the template of manufacturer-dealer vertical restraints
outlined earlier. Within this composite, courts expressly characterize
the hospital-physician relationship as "vertical" and invoke the rule
of reason standard in light of an appreciation of the procompetitive
benefits associated with exclusive contracts. Furthermore, within this
vertical realm, intra-firm restraints are viewed as efficiencyenhancing and credited with stimulating greater competition in the
"inter-brand" market of hospital competition. Consistent with
contemporary beliefs about the efficiency of vertical contracting,
courts express agnosticism about particular private contractual forms,
and reject invitations to judicially pre-determine the type or timing of
competition that should take place in the market. One can add within
the vertical composite a place for suspect forms of horizontal
collusion. These horizontal issues, however, take the form of a
residual concern about dealer boycotts, rather than the central focus
that characterizes traditional per se frames of reference.
A.

Composite:
Relations

The Vertical Nature of Hospital-Physician

Antitrust law maintains a strong affinity for tight binary
distinctions, for example, per se versus rule of reason analysis, or
vertical versus horizontal relations. In crossing the divide separating
horizontal from vertical relations, one also crosses a rhetorical divide
that typically opens the door to more lenient rule of reason evaluation
and often affords an effective presumption in favor of the
reasonableness of the conduct in question. Given the joint nature of
most forms of hospital-physician production, the "vertical" label is
more contestable here than it is in traditional manufacturer-distributor
relationships. Nevertheless, many courts feel comfortable discussing
hospital exclusive contracts as "vertical," or as sufficiently close to
make the analogy judicially persuasive.
The following cases illustrate the point. Leyba v. Hartmut

31 See Hammer & Sage, supra note 27.
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Renger Anesthesia Specialists32 was brought in the wake of a merger
between an allopathic and an osteopathic hospital. The merged entity
entered into an exclusive contract with the MD anesthesiologists, and
the excluded DO anesthesiologists brought an antitrust suit. The court
classified the relationship between the hospital and the physicians as
being vertical in nature, stating:
The evidence shows that St. Joseph [hospital] is not at the
same market level as either Dr. Renger or ASA, and is not
in competition with either of these parties for the provision
of anesthesiology services. Hence the relationship is not
horizontal. If anything, the evidence shows that the
relationship between the defendants is vertical.33
At the same time, the court noted some discomfort with the
analogy: "It is not clear from the case law whether the vertical
in
restraint concept would be directly applicable in this situation, 34
case."
distribution'
'product
classic
a
not
is
this
that
fact
light of the
Often times, given the more overtly contractual and armslength relationships between providers in managed care networks, the
analogy between exclusive contracting and vertical non-price
restraints is easier for courts to recognize. Capital Imaging
Associates, P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Associates, Inc., for
example, involved a radiologist suing over his exclusion from the
defendant's independent practice association ("IPA") model HMO.
The court cited the alleged vertical nature of the relationship as a
means of avoiding application of the per se rule. "Plaintiff has
alleged that defendants' activities constitute an illegal group boycott
and an illegal tying agreement. However, the defendants' type of
exclusivity practices are vertical, nonprice restraints that are analyzed
not under the per se rule, but under the 'rule of reason' standard. 36
court cited directly to the Supreme Court's decision
For authority,
37 the
in Sylvania.

32

874 F. Supp. 1229 (D.N.M. 1994).

33

Id. at 1240.

34 Id.

36

725 F. Supp. 669 (N.D.N.Y.).
Id. at 677.

37

Id. (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36

35

(1976)).
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In Reddy v. Good Samaritan Hospital,38 plaintiff
anesthesiologist left the primary group providing anesthesiology
services at the hospital to start his own sole proprietorship. The
difficulties working with multiple independent providers led the
hospital to demand that all physicians form a single group that it
could work with. Plaintiff refused to rejoin the group and sued under
the antitrust laws to enjoin the hospital from entering into an
exclusive contract with his former employer. Citing the Supreme
Court's recent decision in NYNEX, 39 the court held that the exclusive
contract was vertical in nature and therefore could not form the basis
of a per se illegal group boycott. 4° Then, citing Sylvania and Business
Electronics, the court held that non-price vertical restraints, such as
the allocation
of customers, would be subject to rule of reason
41
analysis.
The final case within our composite treating hospitalphysician relations as fundamentally vertical is Smith v. Northern
Michigan Hospital, Inc. 42 Smith arose after the merger of two
hospitals in Petoskey, Michigan. The merged entity consolidated
emergency rooms to one facility and decided to staff the emergency
room via an exclusive contract with full-time emergency room
physicians. Plaintiffs, who had previously helped staff the emergency
room on a part-time basis at one of the pre-merged hospitals, sued
alleging antitrust violations. The Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs'
theory of a horizontal conspiracy.
The present case does not involve a group of horizontal
competitors whose joint control over some essential facility
produces an unreasonable restraint on trade. Rather, NMH,
as the coordinator and supplier of an essential but limited
public service, stands in a vertical relationship to both the
38

137 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ohio 2000).

NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998) (limiting application of
the per se rule against group boycotts to horizontal relations).
40 Reddy, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
39

41 Id. See also Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Med. Ctr., No. 81 C
4296, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12377, at *9 (N.D. 111. Oct. 25, 1983) ("[Tjhe
Exclusive Contract between the Medical Center and Anesthesia Associates is a
form of vertical combination which must be analyzed under the Rule of Reason.");
Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (10th Cir. 1992)
(characterizing the relationship between the defendant hospital and its physicians as
vertical in nature and therefore subject to rule of reason analysis).
42 703 F.2d 942 (6thCir. 1983).
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contract]
Bums Clinic [the group awarded the exclusive
43
Petoskey.
in
physicians
and the independent
The vertical frame sets courts up to analyze hospital-physician
exclusive contracts largely in the same manner they would examine a
manufacturer's system of distribution.
Hospital Exclusive
B. Composite:
Substantial Procompetitive Benefits

Contracts

Generate

In the fabled realm of vertical relations, it is often difficult to
discern whether an assertion of procompetitive benefits precedes or
follows from an assertion of a "vertical" relationship. In most
hospital exclusive contracting cases, however, the economic benefits
of the arrangement are real and multifaceted. Courts have been quick
to recognize a wide variety of benefits associated with hospital
exclusive contracting. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Jefferson Parish44 set the mold for subsequent judicial analyses of
these practices. Jefferson Parish involved an excluded physician's
challenge to a hospital's exclusive contract with a firm of
anesthesiologists to provide services at the hospital. The plaintiff
attempted to characterize the contract as an illegal tie between
inpatient surgical and anesthesiology services. In advocating
upholding the legality of the exclusive contract under the rule of
reason, O'Connor outlined the economic rationale behind the alleged
tie:
The tie-in improves patient care and permits more efficient
hospital operation in a number of ways. From the viewpoint
of hospital management, the tie-in ensures 24-hour
anesthesiology coverage, aids in standardization of
procedures and efficient use of equipment, facilitates
flexible scheduling of operations, and permits the hospital
more effectively to monitor the quality of anesthesiological
services .... Given this evidence of the advantages and
effectiveness of the closed anesthesiology department, it is
not surprising that, as the District Court found, such
arrangements are accepted practice in the majority of
hospitals of New Orleans and in the health care industry

41 Id. at 953.
44 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466

U.S. 2 (1984).
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45

Comparable procompetitive benefits of exclusive contracting
have been tallied by other courts. In Balaklaw v. Lovell,46 the court
reasoned that "the [exclusive] contract appears to best meet the needs
of the purchaser, the hospital, and by extension its patients, and
therefore it is clearly justified on pro-competitive grounds. 4 7 Other
courts have reached similar conclusions. The court in Dos Santos
noted: "The exclusive contract between Medical Center and
Anesthesia Associates produces benefits to consumers - including a
continuous and assured supply of the proper quantity and quality of
anesthesiology services as well as other efficiencies referenced in the
foregoing findings of this Court." 48 The court in Northern Michigan
Hospital stated: "The appellants have failed to present evidence
which would contradict NMH's manifestly legitimate and wellsupported justification that full-time specialists trained as emergency
room physicians provide medical services superior to those of
generalists who rotate
on a part-time basis while maintaining full
49
private practices."

45 Jefferson ParishHosp., 446

U.S. at 43-44. O'Connor further argued that the

exclusive contract provided specific benefits to patients.
Further, the tying arrangement is advantageous to patients because, as
the District Court found, the closed anesthesiology department places
upon the hospital, rather than the individual patient, responsibility to
select the physician who is to provide anesthesiological services. The
hospital also assumes the responsibility that the anesthesiologist will be
available, will be acceptable to the surgeon, and will provide suitable
care to the patient. In assuming these responsibilities - responsibilities
that a seriously ill patient frequently may be unable to discharge - the
hospital provides a valuable service to its patients. And there is no
indication that patients were dissatisfied with the quality of
anesthesiology that was provided at the hospital or that patients wished
to enjoy the services of anesthesiologists other than those that the
hospital employed.
Id.
46

14 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 1994).

47

Id. at 799 n. 13

48

Dos Santos, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12377, at *13-*14.

49 Smith v. N. Mich. Hosp., Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 953 (6th Cir. 1983). See also
Korshin v. Benedictine Hosp., 34 F. Supp. 2d 133, 136 (N.D. N.Y. 1999) (noting
the multiple administrative, economic and patient safety motives outlined in a
consultant's report relied upon by the Hospital Board in moving to an exclusive
contract for anesthesiology services); Martin v. Memorial Hosp., 130 F.3d 1143,
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C. Composite: Hospital Restrictions on Intra-Brand Competition
Strengthen Inter-Brand Competition
There are two important steps in this analysis. First, courts
maintain that the unilateral imposition of standards or qualifications
by a hospital can increase the competitiveness of the hospital vis a vis
its rivals. Second, courts express a belief that the standards not only
stimulate competition, but competition, in turn, will discipline
hospitals that set inappropriate internal restrictions. Some of the
reasoning for this aspect of the antitrust composite is borrowed from
staff privilege as well as exclusive contracting cases. In upholding a
hospital's right to contract only with physician anesthetists, thereby
excluding nurse anesthetists, the Ninth Circuit reasoned "hospitals
must make choices about the types of qualifications a practitioner
must have to apply for staff privileges in various fields of practice.
These restrictions help it provide more efficient, higher quality
services in order to compete against other hospitals."5 ° Similar
reasoning is invoked to support a hospital's right to strictly define its
staff privilege policies: "[A] non-monopolist hospital's policy of
restricting staff appointments to very highly qualified applicants did
not impose an unreasonable restraint on trade, because by building a
high quality staff the hospital would improve its competitive posture,
thereby increasing competition in the relevant market." 5' It is easy to
extend this analysis to the adoption of exclusive contracts. "The
contract with Anesthesia Associates enhances the Medical Center's
ability to compete with these hospitals by upgrading the quality of its
anesthesia service. The contract may benefit competition among
anesthesiologists by encouraging them to improve the qualit of their
services in order to obtain these contracts with hospitals." 5 Later in
1150 (5th Cir.1997) (exclusivity provides for standardization, uniformity and
quality control); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1457 (11th Cir.
1991) (exclusivity permits centralization, increasing ability to monitor and control
quality); Beard v. Parkview Hosp., 912 F.2d 138, 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (exclusive
contracting increases competition and quality); Steuer v. Nat'l Med. Ctr., 672 F.
Supp. 1489, (D.S.C. 1987) (exclusive contracting increases quality and
monitoring), aff'd, 846 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988); Mosby v. Am. Med. Int'l, Inc., 656
F. Supp. 601, 609 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (exclusive contracting is pro-competitive).
50 Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1412 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted).
51 Potters Med. Ctr. v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 1986)
(citing Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), affid, 688 F.2d
824 (3d Cir. 1982)).
52 Dos Santos, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12377, at *8-*9.
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the opinion, the court noted that the "exclusive anesthesiology
contract between the Medical Center and Anesthesia Associates
is the
' 53
result of competition, not a restriction on competition."
Most judicial opinions do not expressly characterize their
analysis of hospital exclusive contracting and staff privileges in terms
of a relationship between intra- and inter-brand competition, and
perhaps such a framing would not be entirely appropriate.
Nevertheless, the logic underlying the courts' reasoning in hospital
cases directly parallels the logic underlying the Supreme Court's
opinions in Sylvania and Business Electronics. Again, the more
overtly contractual relations underlying managed care make some of
these parallels easier to observe. Doctor's Hospital of Jefferson, Inc.
v. Southeast Medical Alliance, Inc.,54 involved a hospital suing a
managed care preferred provider organization ("PPO") network after
the hospital's membership was terminated. In dismissing the
plaintiffs antitrust claim, the court evaluated the PPO's actions
expressly in terms borrowed from the realm of vertical contracting.
Competition among managed-care plans checks any
anticompetitive effects of market power achievable from
aggregating providers of hospital services in much the same
way as interbrand competition "provides a significant
check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power
because of the ability of consumers
to substitute a different
55
brand of the same prioduct."
Competition between hospitals is assumed to discipline
individual hospital behavior, while stricter individual standards are
assumed to strengthen inter-hospital competition.

53

Dos Santos, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12377, at *13.

" 123 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 308 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 51 n.19 (1977)). While beyond the scope of this essay, it is useful to pause and
ask what type of conditions would be necessary in practice to generate forms of
inter-hospital competition that would fulfill the theoretical role suggested by the
courts. Hospital markets are predominantly local and vary greatly in their level of
competitiveness. Competition in many markets is relatively thin. What level of
competition is necessary to achieve a result that might justify the judicial
invocation of the vertical restraints reasoning articulated in Sylvania? Are there
other sources of market discipline that can substitute for the absence of active interhospital competition? These are some of the questions that would have to be
addressed if a more sophisticated analysis of "vertical" contracting practices were
to be brought to bear in health care.
55
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D. Composite: Judicial Agnosticism about Corporate Form and
the Structure of Competition
Businesses, even hospitals, have a right to determine with
whom they deal. 56 Consistent with this laissez faire ethic is the belief
that competition should determine the level of quality and range of
services available on the market, not professionals per se, and not the
courts.57 In Giampolo v. Somerset Hospital Centerfor Health, the
hospital had originally extended the plaintiff neurologist a limited
monopoly in the ability to interpret certain radiology procedures such
as electrocephalography ("EMGs"). Subsequently, the hospital
altered its policy to permit radiologists to also interpret those
procedures, at the option of the treating physician. Plaintiff sued for
alleged antitrust violations, arguing, among other things, that
permitting radiologists to perform the interpretation would reduce the
quality of such services. The court rejected the argument, reasoning
that the original limitation was a restriction on the market, and that a
free market would be the ultimate arbiter of who was in the best
position to interpret various procedures, even if the end result was to
have fewer procedures interpreted by neurologists. The court noted:
Yet even if the hospital's decision did reduce the overall
level of care, it did so in a way that did not implicate
antitrust concerns .... By Giampolo's reasoning, a health
insurer could injure competition simply by declining, for
reasons of cost control, to reimburse for any given medical
procedure. Simply put, a reduction in supply which
diminishes competition implicates antitrust policy; a
reduction in demand which puts downward pressure on
physicians' incomes does not.

56

Ford v. Stroup, No. 3:94-0544, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21004, at *57-*58

(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 1996) ("As a general rule, hospitals possess the right to
determine with whom they will deal."); Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v.
Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1413 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Hospitals are not public
utilities, required to grant staff privileges to anyone with a medical license. The
Marshfield Clinic's reputation for high quality implies selectivity in the granting of
staff privileges at hospitals affiliated with the Clinic.").
57 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Koefoot v. Am.
Coll. of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
58 No. 95-133J, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14388 (W.D. Pa. May 29, 1998), afftd,
No. 98-3351, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13535 (3d Cir. May 26, 1999).
'9 Id. at *19-*20.
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At issue in the older dealer termination cases was the question
of when competition should take place and in what form. Should
competition take place at the point of dealer-customer interaction
(with efforts to maximize the intensity of inter-dealer rivalry), or
should competition take place at a different point, such as the
consumer's choice between brands, with rivalry taking place at the
level of dealer competition with each other for the right to be an
exclusive purveyor of a particular brand of product? In Sylvania and
Business Electronics, the Court opted for inter-brand competition as
the primary focus of antitrust law, and expressed a fair degree of
agnosticism about how a manufacturer might structure its choice of
intra-brand contractual restraints, or its strategies to rely upon varying
degrees of intra-brand dealer competition to pursue its objectives.
Many of these issues are being rehashed in the medical
context. In Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 60 plaintiff
pathologist was terminated by defendant Associated Pathologists
("APL"), the exclusive pathology contractor at St. John's hospital,
and was not extended staff privileges to continue practicing at the
hospital. Plaintiff argued that the exclusive contract weakened
competition between pathologists in the market and that active
competition at the point where pathology services were demanded by
patients would reduce the price of pathology services and would
increase their quality. The court characterized the plaintiff's
argument as follows:
[T]he exclusive agreements prevented patients at St. John's
Hospital from having their pathology work done by anyone
other than an APL doctor, and they prevented pathologists
who were not APL members from offering his or her
services at St. John's. The plaintiff contends that the
exclusive agreements had an adverse effect upon
competition in the area of pathology services, because
competition among pathologists would result in lower
prices and/or increased
quality of pathology work done for
61
St. John's patients.
This argument is very similar to claims made in dealer
termination cases, which allege that increased competition at the
retail level will lead to lower retail prices and/or improved retail
services for customers.

60

676 F. Supp. 1388 (C. D. II1. 1987), affd, 844 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1988).

61

Id. at 1394-95.
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The court in Collins rejected the plaintiffs argument. There
are alternative ways to arrange competition, other than at the point of
demand for individual pathology services. Competition can instead
take place at the time that the exclusive contract is awarded or
renewed.
The exclusive arrangement that APL has with St. John's
Hospital was terminable by either party on 90 days notice,
which suggests that St. John's can cancel the contract if
another pathological service makes a better bid (in terms of
prices and/or quality of services) to supply the package of
pathological services which APL supplies. This approach
indeed involves competition, not at the level of each
individual lab test that must be performed for a patient, nor
at the level of competition among individual pathologists
for one or more job openings available at a hospital. This
competition, rather, involves the right to provide the
hospital with the entire package of pathological services
62
which the Hospital (because of its patients) requires.
This redefined version of competition still affords patients
with individual choice, but redefines the moment when that choice is
exercised.
In the present case, even though the patients in St. John's
Hospital do not have a choice of having doctors other than
those from APL perform pathology work, they do have a
choice prior to entering the hospital about which hospital
they will enter, based upon factors such as price, quality,
the type of services, and the staff members (including
pathologists) of the hospitals in the relevant geographic
market.
While not a hospital-physician exclusive contract case,

62 Id. at 1397. See also Dos Santos, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12377, at *13
("[The) exclusive anesthesiology contract between the Medical Center and
Anesthesia Associates is the result of competition, not a restriction on competition.
It is the result of a process of rivalry to be the hospital's supplier of anesthesia
services over a period of time."); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793 (2d Cir. 1994)
(intensified physician competition for the exclusive contract itself improves quality
and benefits patients).
63 Collins, 676 F. Supp. at 1404-05.
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Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans64 illustrates another parallel between
heath care and the antitrust laws governing vertical restraints. In
Ambroze, physician anesthesiologists challenged aspects of their
managed care contract that they argued interfered with their ability to
provide quality care to their patients. The physicians' claims parallel
those made by retailers and distributors asserting the right to establish
the non-price terms of service free from manufacturer-imposed
restraints. The court summarized the anesthesiologists' argument as
follows:
In plaintiffs' view, "for physicians to compete effectively
they must have the freedom to maximize the quality of
patient care within the framework of current standards of
medical care and medical necessity." Because Aetna
enrollees do not pay them directly for their services, Aetna
physicians can only compete against each other on the basis
of service. But competition among Aetna anesthesiologists
is restrained, plaintiffs argue, because the effect of the
Agreements is to undermine their independent, professional
judgment regarding the nature and quality of services to
offer enrollees. This is so because amendment and
termination provisions in HMO contracts are the ultimate
tools used65 by managed care companies to control
physicians.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, although it did so
by making an analogy to the managed care company's role as an
agent standing in the buyer's shoes, rather than as a manufacturer
asserting the right to establish intra-brand restraints upon its system
of distribution.
The court argued that the managed care company was
properly standing in the shoes of the patient, making price and quality
decisions on the patient's behalf. Relying upon the First Circuit's
decision in Kartell,66 the court held that establishing the standard of
care would be left in the first instance to the economic exchange
between the consumer and the managed care company itself. If that
64

Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans, No. 95 Civ. 6631, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

7274 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1996), vacated by No. 96-7778, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
1048 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1997), affid by Finkelstein v. Aetna Health Plans, No. 979064, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 12493 (2d Cir. May 5, 1998).
65

Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *14

66 Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984).
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market was incapable of safeguarding the patient's interest, then
recourse could be had to regulators or legislators. 67 For antitrust
purposes, however, physicians were 68disempowered from challenging
the actions or decisions of the payor.
It is interesting to note how the same result in Ambroze could
have been reached by application of the rules governing vertical
restraints. In Albrecht v. Herald Co.,69 the Supreme Court justified its
per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing, in part, on the
grounds that such prices could prevent dealers from providing their
own levels of quality and non-price services in newspaper
distribution. 0 In reversing Albrecht's per se approach, the Court in
State Oil Co. v. Khan7 1 expressly privileged the manufacturer's right
to define the non-price dimensions of service over that of retailers
and distributors. The rationale is the same as the basic intra-brand
versus inter-brand logic motivating the Court in Sylvania.
The Albrecht Court also expressed the concern that
maximum prices may be set too low for dealers to offer
consumers essential or desired services. But such conduct,

67

Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *21-*22 (citing Kartell, 749 F.2d

at 929 n.7).
68 Upon remand from the Second Circuit, the district court considered and
rejected the plaintiffs' amended complaint. The court made even more express its
contention that hospitals and insurance companies function as appropriate
surrogates for patients in these transactions:
In the instant case, the Hospitals and Aetna were jointly acting on
behalf of the patients to purchase services from the plaintiffs for those
patients. For their part, doctors have chosen to associate themselves
with particular hospitals, accepting attendant conditions and standards
of employment, and rely on payments from insurance companies for
their income. By selecting the Hospitals as the location for their surgery
and Aetna as their insurance company, patients in effect place those
institutions in the position of joint agents for the patient to bargain with
the anesthesiologists on their behalf regarding the terms and price of
care they will receive. Charging the Hospitals and Aetna with
conspiracy misses the point that there is no prohibition in these
circumstances against the buyer and seller having more than a single
intermediary in their negotiations with each other.
Finkelstein v. Aetna Health Plan, No. 95 Civ. 6631, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759,
at *16, (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 1997).
69 390 U.S. 145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
'o Id. at 152-53.
7' 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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by driving away customers, would seem likely to harm
manufacturers as well as dealers and consumers, making it
unlikely that a supplier would set such a price as a matter of
business judgment.
If the manufacturer makes inappropriate or incorrect
decisions, it will be punished by inter-brand competition in the
market place. While physicians may lay claim to be in a better
position to independently assess the quality concerns of their patients
than either gas station owners or the sellers of newspapers, the court
in Ambroze was just as willing to trust the functioning of markets to
faithfully communicate consumer quality demands as was the Court
in State Oil.
E. Composite: Dealer Boycotts - The Vertical Placeholder for
Horizontal Conspiracies
Examining the problem of hospital exclusive contracting
through the fabled lens of vertical restraints highlights how
competition in health care is similar to competition in other markets,
and suggests the propriety of evaluating the legality of such restraints
pursuant to the rule of reason. This is not to suggest that hospital
cases raise no legitimate anticompetitive concerns. Even within the
realm of vertical non-price restraints, one is still concerned about the
problem of vertical restraints facilitating collusion between
manufacturers or masking horizontally driven dealer cartels. 73 This
fear is more legitimate in the hospital setting than it is in most
settings of product manufacturing and distribution. There are two sets
of related concerns. First, the hospital structure itself may not be
sufficiently integrated to justify the assumption of unitary action on
the part of the hospital vis a vis the physicians receiving an exclusive
contract. This is simply a version of the Copperweld problem that
often gets raised in hospital antitrust litigation. The absence of
sufficient unity of purpose between the medical staff and the hospital
or Board would invalidate the basic premise that the exclusive
contract is the result of an action by a single independent entity.
Second, even if the board is structurally independent, it is still
possible that competitor-physicians could co-opt or improperly
72 State Oil, 522 U.S. at 17

(citations omitted).

73 Business Electric, 485 U.S. at 725-26 (limiting the antitrust concern

justifying a per se rule against vertical price restraints to a concern over vertical
agreements facilitating a manufacturer cartel or masking a horizontal dealer cartel).
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influence the hospital's decision making process. This problem has
been acknowledged by some courts. 7 4 Nevertheless, maintaining a

vertical frame is still important. While concerns over physician led
boycotts remain legitimate, they are likely to be the exception rather
than the rule. As a result, they can be appropriately relegated to a
secondary position and policed on a case-by-case basis under the rule
of reason.

V.

Looking Ahead: Health Care Contracting in the
Future

Since the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in Goldfarb,
antitrust treatment of the professions has moved increasingly from
status to contract. This might superficially appear to disadvantage
physicians. While physicians can no longer claim special antitrust
treatment as a matter of right, they can still exert substantial
economic influence as to how health care markets and contracting
practices will evolve. To date, hospital exclusive contracts have been
limited primarily to hospital-based practices. In these arrangements,
the hospital is typically the dominant party and there is often a fairly
competitive labor market for physician services that can be regional if
not national in scope. These types of practices are natural candidates
for tighter integration. If one looks at non-hospital-based physician
practices, however, the future of hospital physician contracting is
much less clear. Making predictions in this area is dangerous. At
early stages of managed care evolution, many people, including
myself, were predicting the emergence of tightly integrated health
plans. These plans, not unlike staff model HMOs, would combine the
physician, hospital and payor function into a fairly seamless package.
The more starry-eyed amongst us even predicted that these tightly
integrated plans would begin to differentiate themselves in terms of
practice style or allegiance to particular sets of clinical guidelines or
practice protocols.
This did not happen. What emerged instead was the rapid
See Collins, 676 F. Supp. at 1399 ("The court explained that because the
M.D.s controlled the hospital's admission decisions, the case was similar to the
situation where a group of firms at one level of distribution, the doctors' level, had
used their existing relationship with a supplier to exclude their competitors from
dealing with the supplier.") (citing Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 819-20
(3d Cir. 1984)). See also Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 656 F. Supp. 760 (D.
Mont. 1987) (upholding jury finding of an antitrust violation on the basis of
evidence suggesting that the hospital board was pressured by physician
anesthesiologist to adopt a policy banning nurse anesthetist from the facility).
14
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growth of largely undifferentiated managed care plans. These plans
were committed to loosely integrated, open networks of physicians
that afforded consumers maximum choice of provider. Rather than
tight integration, most physician groups contracted with multiple
managed care plans. Managed care plans, in turn, seldom demanded
any special allegiance from their providers. In this environment, very
little plan differentiation took place.
There are a number of possible explanations for this pattern.
Many economists would say this is simply evidence of what
consumers want, a strong demand-driven preference for patient
choice. There is substantial wisdom in this statement. Still, this
preference for "choice" over the possible efficiencies of integration
took place during a time of unprecedented national prosperity (at
least for those Americans who enjoyed the benefits of employerbased health insurance), where sharper tradeoffs between costs and
choice might be avoided. It remains to be seen if similar preferences
will persist during an economic downturn. There are additional
factors that have frustrated the causes of integration and
differentiation. While antitrust treatment of the professions has
largely shifted from status to contract, other areas of health law
remain largely status-based. State regulatory structures are still
premised on visions of uniformity and lock-step sameness. Moreover,
the common law still approaches health care primarily through the
lens of torts, with the imposition of unitary malpractice standards that
constrain the type of contracting practices that would facilitate
greater differentiation. If one believes that strong market forces have
the power to move the common law, however, these are still fairly
weak explanations for why stronger patterns of private ordering have
not emerged in managed care markets.
One is left with something of a paradox. Coasian theories of
the firm predict a fluid boundary between firms, contracts and
markets. Nevertheless, all other things being equal, one would expect
dominant patterns of contracting to emerge over time. They have not
(or at least not yet). The work of people like Larry Casalino, Jamie
Robinson and others has illustrated a great amount of
experimentation leading mainly to patterns of herding and cycling,
without the emergence of consistent patterns of private ordering.

75 See generally James C. Robinson & Lawrence P. Casalino, Reevaluation of

Capitation Contracting in New York and California, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 7
(July/Aug. 2001); James C. Robinson, Physician Organizationin California: Crisis
and Opportunity, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 81 (July/Aug. 2001); Lawrence P. Casalino,
Canariesin a Coal Mine: California Physician Groups and Capitation,20 HEALTH
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Within this disorder, there are lessons for health professionals. The
private domain of contracts is highly contestable. There is no
deterministic logic that hospitals must inevitably dominate
physicians, or that payors will enslave providers. Indeed, the pattern
in California was for physicians to merge into large multi-specialty
groups and assume the lion's share of managed care financial risk,
even entering into sub-capitation agreements with hospitals. 76 Many
of these physician groups ultimately lost their shirts in the process,
but the failure of their experiment against a backdrop of few clear
successes need not be judged too harshly. An important object lesson
remains. The physician, hospital and payor pieces of the health care
firm can be put together in many different combinations, with
ultimate success being determined by success in the market. The
future is still very much up for grabs.
This being said, is it useful to view doctors as distributors?
The move from status-based professional distinctions in antitrust law
to a focus on the efficiency of contracting practices started with
Goldfarb and continues in the hospital exclusive contracting cases of
today. The "vertical" frame suggested by the composite of cases
created in this essay is useful not because doctors are no different
from distributors, or because all such vertical restraints should be
upheld under the rule of reason, or even because it is particularly
meaningful or accurate to classify relations in health care as being
"vertical" in nature. Rather, the vertical frame is useful because it
helps courts focus on the correct question: what is the economic
rationale underlying the hospital-physician contractual relationship.
Once the correct question is acknowledged, however, there is actually
very little in the vertical label that provides insight into the correct
answer.
In the future, antitrust courts are likely to see more
complicated forms of hospital-physician contracting. The competitive
effects of these arrangements will be harder to assess than the
exclusive contracting cases of the past. Ideally, this would be viewed
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as an opportunity, not an obstacle. The opportunity would be to start
developing the tools necessary to identify and articulate the economic
benefits and possible competitive threats of complicated forms of
professional contracting. Therefore, it is important that the
comparison between doctors and distributors not be used as an
occasion to let legal categorization drive legal analysis. Health care
and other professional markets are complicated, but it is a complexity
that we can learn to live with and strive to understand. In the process,
antitrust courts might even start pouring greater analytic content into
the fabled law of vertical restraints than currently exists.

